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New knowledge str!Lu:tures, or just common 
ground? 
Breakthroughs in international negotiations 
Introduction 
Breakthroughs in international negotiations 
are intriguing phenomena, challenging both 
historians and international relations 
theorists: Why do breakthroughs happen? 
And why at a given time? Realist scholars 
of international relations, of course, would 
point to the merging of interests as the 
overriding explanatory factor. Such an 
answer, however, begs the question of why 
common ground materialized at that given 
time. More recent approaches have thus 
offered alternative explanations, discourse 
theorists offering the most radical 
alternative understandings, emphasizing 
the limitations and opportunities inherent 
in cognitive and lingual factors. 
As a contribution to what will certainly 
be a continuing debate, this article 
evaluates the explanatory power of two 
theoretical approaches-emphasizing 
'knowledge structures' and 'world views' 
respectively-regarding one case-the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963. 
On the basis of that case study/theoretical 
comparison are offered some tentative 
general conclusions regarding the analysis 
of international negotiations. 
The analytical starting point will be the 
arguments introduced in the article 'The 
Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence 
of New Knowledge Structures in 
International Negotiation',' published in 
International Studies Quarterly a few 
years ago. Here, G. Matthew Bonham of 
Syracuse University and Victor M. Sergeev 
and Pave] B. Parshin of the Analytical 
Center on Science and Industrial Policy in 
Moscow, argue that the emergence of new 
knowledge structures facilitated agreement 
between Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev 
and US president John F. Kennedy on the 
LTBT in 1963. They have reached this 
conclusion through the construction and 
analysis of cognitive maps of exchanges 
between Kennedy and Khrushchev on the 
test-ban issue during the years 1961-1963; 
as agreement came closer, the two were 
found to adjust their representations of 
reality in a way that indicate a change in 
basic knowledge structures, which again 
made agreement possible. 
The main focus of Bonham, Parshin, and 
Sergeev is not the test ban-negotiations, but 
the cognitive mapping approach. They 
emphasize language, the way the actors' 
use of language reveal their 'pre· 
understandings' of the world, and the way 
these factors determine policy, rather than 
the substance of the test-ban negotiations. 
Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to 
evaluate their theoretical approach on the 
basis of the insights it produces, and 
compare their conclusions with those 
achieved through an alternative approach. 
Focus here will thus be on the approach as 
applied to the test-ban negotiations by 
these authors, not the approach as such. 
The basic argument below is that a more 
nuanced interpretation of the test-ban 
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negotiations-which also fits better with the 
available evidence-can be constructed 
through emphasizing the impact of world 
views2-basic features of political actors' 
perceptions and opinions of the world-and 
the manner in which these influenced the 
way political actors evaluated the issue at 
hand and thus how they defined their 
countries' interests. The approach is 
somewhat similar to realism in its focus on 
interests, but tends towards discourse 
theory in its insistence that actors' 
definitions of their interests-far from being 
objectively or rationally determined-can 
only be explained by reference to the basic 
features of actors' understanding of the 
world in general. The approach also draws 
on the discipline of diplomatic history in 
its insistence that thorough empirical 
investigation-in addition to theoretical 
insights-is essential to explain concrete 
events. 
Such an approach help generate 
explanations both for why agreement was 
reached on a limited test ban in 1963, for 
why agreement was not reached on a 
comprehensive test ban during the 1958-
63 period, as well as for why the arms race 
continued for another twenty plus years 
despite the shared interest in arms control 
that the LTBT signified. 
Cognitive mapping and the limited test ban 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev claim that 
the traditional explanations for why the 
LTBT was achieved in 1963 have 
emphasized the hard work of the 
negotiators and the intense personal 
commitment to arms control of Khrushchev 
and Kennedy in the aftermath of the Cuban 
missile crisis (215). They find that these 
explanations "provide little insight about 
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how the negotiators worked [ ... ] to bridge 
their differences and reach an agreement." 
(216) 
Unhappy with this historiographical 
state of affairs, they look for alternative 
explanations. They try to illustrate the 
impact of deep-seated cognitive structures 
through the utilization of cognitive 
mapping-"a specialized technique for 
portraying causal and quasi-causal 
thinking with respect to general situations 
or specific issues that are treated in a text". 
The authors have analyzed and compared 
"[c]ognitive maps of Soviet and American 
officials in the talks leading to the Limited 
Test-Ban Treaty [ ... ] Soviet negotiators, 
including Premier Khrushchev, were 
hypothesized to use 'processual' 
representations, while U.S. negotiators, 
including President Kennedy, were 
hypothesized to use 'procedural' 
representation. [ ... ] comparisons of the 
negotiations over time were expected to 
reveal the emergence of new knowledge 
structures that may have helped to 
facilitate an agreement on nuclear testing 
[ ... ]" (216) 
The authors point out that recent 
research-some of it their own 3-have 
suggested that representatives of different 
cultures tend to comprehend the world in 
fundamentally different ways. Therefore-
in international negotiations-"[n]ew 
knowledge structures may have to emerge 
before participants are able to understand 
the positions of negotiators from another 
culture." (217) 'Knowledge structures' are 
deep-seated mental patterns that determine 
how people order their perceptions and 
thereby determine their 'pre-
understanding' of the world, which again 
determines how they represent the world 
through language. Knowledge structures, 
pre-understandi ngs, and modes of 
representation are communal, that is, 
shared among representatives of a culture 
or culture area. 
The authors isolate two types of pre-
understandings, which in turn leads to two 
different modes of representation, as 
relevant to the test-ban negotiations: a 
holistic pre-understanding-which leads to 
a processual representation of reality, 
whereby "a change of a political situation 
is seen in terms of continuous processes, 
without any intermediate steps" (217-8); 
and a structural pre-understanding-which 
leads to procedural representation "that 
takes into account patterned relations 
between objects [and] relations between 
states of affairs are described [ ... ] in terms 
of causal linkages" (219). 
The process of cognitive mapping and the 
methodology of the authors' will be studied 
in greater detail below. For now it suffices 
to say that the authors found what they 
were looking for: Kennedy used mostly 
procedural representation throughout the 
negotiations; Khrushchev used processual 
representation but, as the negotiations 
progressed, he at times used procedural 
representation. The early differences were 
hypothesized to have hindered agreement, 
the subsequent merging to have facilitated 
it. Moreover, in the weeks leading up to 
agreement the two leaders were found to 
have translated each other from procedural 
to processual representation, and vice versa 
(238). lntercoder reproducibility-
presumably a guarantor of verifiability and 
objectivity-were established, as the 
findings were similar for all the people 
involved in the mapping process-the 
authors and a graduate assistant that did 
not know the purpose of the coding (225). 
According to the authors, then, the 
"changes in representations over time 
provide evidence for the notion that the 
success of international negotiations is 
related to the degree to which the parties 
can construct a shared discursive space, 
which amounts to their building a shared 
reality" (238). As to the test-ban issue, 
somewhat simplified, this happened when 
the mutual apocalyptic experience of the 
Cuban missile crisis led Khrushchev's and 
Kennedy's understandings of the perils of 
the arms race to merge, which facilitated 
agreement on the LTBT. 
If substantiated, these findings would 
constitute quite a breakthrough for the 
cognitive mapping approach as a tool for 
explaining the development of international 
negotiations. Significant objections can, 
however, be raised, both regarding the 
authors' understanding of the substance of 
the test-ban negotiations, and regarding the 
theoretical merits of the cognitive mapping 
approach. 
A presumption of Bonham, Parshin, and 
Sergeev's argument is that the LTBT 
constituted a seminal change in the basic 
policies of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. This seminal change they hold to 
be due to the emergence of new knowledge 
structures in the aftermath of the Cuban 
missile crisis. This presumption is 
disputable, however. Rather than seeing 
the LTBT as the successful culmination of 
the negotiations taking place from 1958 to 
1963, this article will argue that it should 
be regarded partly as an admission of 
failure in the quest for an inspected and 
comprehensive test-ban treaty, and partly 
as a general gesture of good will that did 
not necessitate substantial compromises. 
Moreover, it is argued that the Cuban 
missile crisis did not change US and Soviet 
'knowledge structures' or 'pre-
understandings', as is evident in the fact 
that the arms race continued for twenty plus 
years after 1963, and that grave mutual 
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suspicions remained in place until the fall 
of Soviet style communism. 
In other words, both the general 
argument of the authors-that new 
knowledge structures emerged-and their 
specific argument-that this led to 
agreement on the LTBT-are modified. 
To substantiate the above claims, a short 
summing up of the relevant round of the 
nuclear test-ban negotiations-which took 
place during the years 1958-1963-is 
necessary. Several analyses of the test-ban 
negotiations have been published,< and the 
factual basis of the version presented below 
is uncontroversial. As to the 'world view' 
approach applied as an explanatory tool, 
it will be discussed in the subsequent 
section on theory. 
The test-ban negotiations 1958-63: 
an overview 
The test-ban negotiations were initiated in 
late 1958, mainly as a result of massive 
pressure from public opinion due to concern 
over the health hazards of radioactive 
fallout from testing in the atmosphere. 
Progress in the negotiations was rather 
slow, however. There were several 
obstacles to agreement: The most 
important and ultimately decisive dispute 
pertained to the inspection of suspected 
underground nuclear tests; inspecting 
against suspected atmospheric and sub-
oceanic tests was considered relatively 
simple, while space testing was considered 
incredibly complicated and prohibitively 
expensive. 
Inspecting against underground tests was 
a rather complex, three-step affair. 5 The 
first step was to consist of seismic detection 
stations spread throughout the world 
registering above-normal seismic 
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disturbances. Once this had been 
accomplished, data concerning the nature 
and location of the disturbance had to be 
analyzed to determine whether it should be 
identified as a suspicious event; almost any 
seismic disturbance could with some 
justification be classified as such. Once a 
suspicious event had been identified 
through a mix of guesswork and analysis, 
one more step remained-verification 
through on-site inspection. The 
approximate location of a suspicious event 
having been determined, an inspection 
team was to be dispatched to the area and 
collect earth samples to determine whether 
above-normal levels of radioactivity were 
present. 
Its theoretical simplicity notwithstanding, 
there were significant technical problems 
attached to the on-site inspection. First, the 
area that would have to be inspected in each 
instance would be rather large-according to 
US treaty proposals at least 500 square miles. 
Secondly, the area throughout which 
radioactivity would spread after an 
underground explosion was quite limited, 
possibly as small as 150 square feet. Thirdly, 
the method of inspection was quite 
cumbersome, including drilling to significant 
depths to check for radioactivity. Thus, the 
on-site inspection would be a complex and 
rather tedious affair. Still, some kind of 
method with the potential to collect proof of 
transgressions had to be included in a treaty. 
The on-site inspection, for all its faults, was 
the only means to achieve this. 
Agreement on the number and modalities 
of these inspections to be allowed for under 
a treaty did not materialize in this period, 
however, and thus no comprehensive test ban 
was agreed upon. US policy-makers, ever 
suspicious of the Soviets, would not accept 
an inadequate inspection system as the basis 
for a treaty, since such a system would 
potentially allow for clandestine Soviet 
testing, and sustained secret testing was seen 
to have the potential to lead to an elimination 
of US nuclear superiority. This was 
considered unacceptable, as US nuclear 
superiority was seen as the main defense 
against an ideologically driven aggressive 
Soviet-led communist bloc that enjoyed a 
substantial advantage in conventional 
weaponry. Moreover, and equally important, 
US decision-makers wanted a test-ban treaty 
to serve as a meaningful precedent for more 
substantial arms control and disarmament. 
This again was preconditioned upon the 
inclusion of provisions for the verification of 
compliance, since it was out of the question 
during the cold war, as it is today, to base 
arms reduction treaties upon trust. 
Consequently, US negotiators throughout the 
1958-1963 period demanded that quite 
extensive on-site inspections be part of a 
comprehensive test-ban treaty. 
We know less about Soviet than about US 
rationales regarding inspection; no primary 
source based works have been published 
on the subject. We do know, however, that 
the Soviets in public denied the need for 
uninhibited' inspections and would nor 
agree to include provisions for them in a 
treaty.7 lt is probable that this was because 
of the role secrecy played in their general 
national security policies. Possibly the 
desire to catch up with the United States 
in nuclear weapons technology provided an 
added rationale, since that could not be 
achieved without testing, and denying the 
need for inspection was guaranteed to block 
any agreement on test limitations while not 
giving the impression that the Soviet Union 
was an obstacle to arms control. 
The disagreement over inspection seems 
to have been a fundamental one, and was 
not resolved. There was progress In one 
sense, as the parties adjusted the number 
of on-site inspections they would accept. 
The basic point, however, is that the Soviets 
at no point accepted uninhibited 
international inspection on their territory, 
and while they did at times accept up to 
three on-site inspections, those were to be 
controlled and restricted by the Soviets 
themselves. The Americans on their part 
at no point were willing to accept less than 
five or six uninhibited inspections, officially 
no less than seven. The Soviet demand that 
they should be allowed to control on-site 
inspections, was seen by the Americans as 
the negation of the very idea of 
international control. 
The essence of the disagreement - seen 
from the US side- was not about numbers, 
but about the degree of transparency 
necessary for credible arms control. For the 
Soviets, the basic point was probably how 
to get a treaty a) without loosing the 
national security edge granted them 
through their closed society, and possibly 
b) without ending their effort to catch up 
with the United States in nuclear weapons 
technology. 
The parties' definitions of interests - as 
defined through their respective world 
views - thus hindered agreement on a 
comprehensive test-ban treaty in the 1958-
1963 period. The question of why there was 
agreement on a limited test-ban treaty in 
1963 remains, however. 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev argue that 
the Cuban missile crisis led to changes in 
Kennedy's and Khrushchev's knowledge 
structures, and thereby their thinking on 
issues of arms control, thus making them 
more willing to compromise on the test-ban 
issue, ultimately leading to the LTBT (221-
2). 
Explaining the development of the test-
ban negotiations by reference to the Cuban 
missile crisis is not a novel idea; to a greater 
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or lesser degree, most analyses of the issue 
credit that crisis with the progress of 
negotiations in 1963. 8It will be argued 
here, however, that the impact of the crisis 
has been overrated, both regarding 
progress towards a comprehensive test-ban 
treaty, regarding the achievement of the 
LTBT, and regarding the emergence of new 
knowledge structures. 
As to the comprehensive treaty, both 
parties did indeed show renewed interest 
in such a treaty in the aftermath of the 
missile crisis. Neither side, however, 
showed any inclination to compromise on 
basic postttons; agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban thus moved no 
closer.' This in itself casts doubt upon the 
idea that the missile crisis led to a general 
breakthrough in the negotiations, or a 
general change in the parties' mindsets, 
given that a comprehensive test ban and 
the inspection system it required was what 
the negotiations so far had stranded on. 
As to a limited treaty, the United States 
had proposed such a treaty in 1959, 1961 
and in August of 1962, the latter being 
almost identical to the LTBT, but the offers 
were rejected by the Soviets. There thus 
was no change in US policy on this issue 
as a result of the missile crisis; the change 
of mind that did occur was on the Soviet 
side. It is possible that Bonham, Parshin, 
and Sergeev's explanation that 
Khrushchev's knowledge structures 
changed as a result of the Cuban missile 
crisis - is correct. That explanation, 
however, raises questions far more difficult 
than the one it answers: Why, having 
discovered nuclear weapons to be so 
dreadful, did Khrushchev not compromise 
on a comprehensive treaty, a step that could 
really have had an impact? The limited 
treaty, after all, would allow the arms race 
to continue almost unabated, and the 
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Soviets moved to accelerate their program 
of nuclear development in the following 
years. This observation leads to the 
essential question of why the arms race 
continued for another twenty plus years, 
given that a "shared reality" (238) had now 
presumably emerged? Knowledge 
structures, after all, are supposed to be 
communal and deep-seated, and are thus 
not well suited as elements of ad hoc 
explanations. 
Until Soviet archives are investigated, we 
will not know for sure why the Soviet 
leadership changed their minds regarding 
a limited test ban. Given the caveats 
pointed out above, however, a more 
plausible hypothesis than that furthered by 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev can be 
formulated. It is probable that only in 1963 
did the Soviets attain a significant 
underground testing capacity. 10 Because of 
this, they could continue testing under the 
terms of a limited ban, and agreeing to an 
atmospheric test ban thus no longer implied 
the risk of the United States increasing their 
lead in nuclear weapons. This explains why 
the Soviets no longer resisted a limited 
treaty. If that is correct, all that was needed 
for the Soviets to agree to the LTBT in 1963 
was a powerful incentive. That incentive 
was provided by the need to score 
propaganda points against China in the 
wake of the full Sino-Soviet split, and the 
need for some course of action that would 
both allow continued testing - to reduce 
or eliminate the US lead in nuclear 
weapons, which was seen as the main 
reason for the Soviet humiliation during the 
Cuban missile crisis - and put an end to 
nuclear fallout - to cater to the demands 
of especially neutral countries that the 
nuclear contamination of the atmosphere 
be stopped. In other words, given their 
general world view - which included both 
the not1on that both capitalist United States 
and Maoist China constituted threats, and 
the idea that one key to the ultimate victory 
of communism was to win the hearts and 
minds of third world peoples -a limited test 
ban was now seen by its leaders to be in 
the interest of the Soviet Union. 
The strength of this explanation is that it 
places the ;tchicvement of the LTBT 
squarely w1thin the general run of Cold 
War surerpower politics, and is consistent 
with the fact thar more substantial arms 
control.111d di"Hmament did not follow. It 
also makes the LTBT fit in with the 
subsequent Soviet build-up in nuclear 
weapons. The treaty was probably seen to 
provide the hesr of two worlds; both the 
public relations scoop of being party to the 
first nuclear arms control treaty, and the 
opportunity to catch up with the United 
States in nuclear weapons technology. The 
explanation of Bonham, Parshin, and 
Sergeev, meanwhile, presupposes a change 
in the knowledge structures of Soviet 
decision makers, which seems to be 
unfounded g1ven the subsequent 
development of Soviet policy. 
The basic point is that the negotiations 
1958-1963 had focused predominantly on 
a comprehensive rest-ban treaty. During 
these negotiations, inspection was the key 
issue, and on this there was no progress 
towards agreement, despite the shock of the 
Cuban missile crisis. To ensure adherence 
to a limited rest ban, mean\vhile, no 
inspection was necessary. The LTBT thus 
did not imply a general breakthrough in 
negotiations, since it did not necessitate 
intrusive inspection procedures. Moreover, 
the nuclear powers were allowed to 
continue their nuclear weapons 
development through underground testing. 
Agreeing to the LTBT was thus- once the 
Soviets had attained an underground 
testing capacity - a win-win situation for 
both parties. 
The LTBT was certainly a laudable 
achievement; it ended nuclear fallout and 
constituted the first arms control 
agreement of the Cold War. In no way, 
however, can the treaty be said to have 
implied a paradigmatic shift in the thinking 
of Soviet and/or US decision-makers. The 
treaty was simply in the interest of both 
parties, that 'interest' being defined by their 
respective Cold War world views - or pre-
understandings, if you will - and taking 
into account the given geopolitical 
situation, the perceived demands of the 
arms race, and the level of technological 
development- as outlined above. 
The version of the test-ban negotiations 
presented by Bonham, Parshin, and 
Sergeev, then, is incomplete to the point of 
being misleading. 11 It postulates a 
breakthrough that did not happen, and a 
paradigmatic change in knowledge 
structures which is held up neither by the 
test-ban negotiations nor by the subsequent 
development of the Cold War. Wherein lie 
the roots of this problem? To answer this 
question, a look at their theoretical starting 
point is in order. 
The cognitive mapping approach to 
international politics 
The essence of the cognitive mapping 
approach is the substitution of signs for 
groups of words, thereby indicating general 
patterns in the way the speaker/writer of 
the phrases 'mapped' represents reality. 
These differences in representation are 
hypothesized to be ea used by differences 
in pre-understanding- general conceptions 
of how the world works. Two such 
representation/pre-understanding pairs are 
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relevant to the Bonham, Parshin and 
Sergeev's analysis of the test-ban issue. 
Processual represe11tation, based on a 
holistic pre-understandi11g, holds that 
"results are the outcomes of processes, and, 
as such, are vague and often conveyed 
metaphorically, for example, 'the victory 
of communism'; 'processes are general'" 
(224). Individual actors "can 'participate' 
in a process by making positive 
contributions to intensify the process or 
negative contributions to inhibit the 
process" (224). When coding processual 
representation, "[a] political or social 
process is portrayed as a vertical arrow 
from an Initial Poi11t, which might refer to 
an event or a series of events, such as the 
October Revolution or the Great Patriotic 
War, to a Result." Influences, positive or 
negative, are listed alongside the lines, with 
pluses or minuses added to show whether 
their influence is intensifying or inhibiting 
the given process (224). 
The 'holistic' pre-understanding is 
claimed to be typical for, among others, 
important parts of Russian and Marxist 
intellectual tradition (218). As to the test-
ban negotiations, the authors illustrate how 
Khrushchev, when discussing the issue, 
places it in the context of a general process 
towards peace and general disarmament. 
This process Khrushchev argues to be 
furthered by Soviet efforts to lessen 
international tensions, and hampered by the 
Western unwillingness to make 
concessions. Inspection, meanwhile, is not 
accepted as a relevant issue - it is held to 
be a decoy employed by the West to 
prevent agreement; i.e., a negative 
influence on the process towards peace. 
Western attempts to establish a causal 
connection between agreement on an 
inspection system and agreement on a 
treaty are rejected. 
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As to maps constructed from procedural 
coding - procedural represe11tatio11 being 
based on a structural pre-understandi11g -
"the concepts of an author are described 
by nodes and the causal links are shown 
by arrows. An arrow with a plus sign 
indicates a positive causal link or a quasi-
causal relation [ ... ] and an arrow with a 
minus sign denotes a negative causal link 
or quasi-causal relation [ ... ] a zero 
indicates the denial of any causal linkage 
[ ... ]" (223). This pre-understanding and 
mode of representation is claimed to be 
typical of representatives of Western 
political culture (219); the authors illustrate 
how president Kennedy represents reality 
in this way, for example when drawing a 
causal connection between the Soviet 
demand for a veto on on-site inspections 
and the lack of progress towards arms 
control and disarmament (233). 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev, however, 
go further than pointing out these trends; 
they lend them explanatory power. They 
argue that because of the differences in 
Kennedy's and Khrushchev's knowledge 
structures, pre-understandings, and modes 
of representation, they were unable to reach 
agreement on a test ban. In this, they play 
down the idea of politicians as rational and 
independent actors, emphasizing instead 
that policies are determined by cognitive 
structures so deep-seated that politicians 
are not even aware of them, far less able 
to control them. 
Significant objections can be raised to the 
cognitive mapping approach as such, and 
will be at a later point. For now, however, 
its basic ideas will be accepted for the sake 
of argument. Given that the cognitive 
mapping approach lend differences in 
modes of representation explanatory 
power, the litmus test of its value in a given 
case should be whether the patterns of 
speech observed can be shown to have 
hindered mutual understanding of 
negotiating positions, which in turn has the 
potential to hinder the emergence of 
agreement even where common ground do 
exist, or- even more profoundly- whether 
they hinder the emergence of common 
ground. 
Pointing out lingual patterns, in other 
words, is not sufficient for the cognitive 
mapping approach to serve the purpose 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev claim that 
it aspires to. The explanatory power of the 
cognitive mapping approach rests upon its 
ability to illustrate a lack of understanding 
between parties that employ different 
'representations' of reality. It must be 
demonstrated that a person representing 
reality in a 'processual' manner is unable 
to comprehend the position of a person 
representing reality in a 'procedural' 
manner, and - as a corollary - that one 
person can only communicate in one mode 
or the other, not both. If this is not 
established, the significance of the 
differences must clearly be downgraded: 
first, if a lack of understanding is not 
established, it is hard to see through what 
mechanisms the lingual patterns impact on 
negotiation results; second, if the modes of 
representation are not mutually exclusive, 
they can not have been absolute barriers 
to understanding. The lingual patterns 
would still be of interest, but would not 
have the explanatory power that the 
cognitive mapping approach invests them 
with. 
It is not clear that Bonham, Parshin, and 
Sergeev have demonstrated that 
Khrushchev and Kennedy communicated in 
only one mode of representation. On the 
contrary, both Khrushchev and Kennedy 
are shown to communicate in both modes. 
As to Khrushchev, the authors themselves 
note that he employs procedural 
representation towards the end of the 
negotiations (238 ). They hold this to be due 
to the shock of the Cuban missile crisis, 
which established new knowledge 
structures in him. That is conceivable, but 
the interpretation does raise the question 
of why Soviet policies and 
representations of reality - seem to have 
been otherwise unaffected. One could solve 
that paradox by postulating a momentary 
shock as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, 
from which Khrushchev later recovered, or 
by claiming that the Soviet leaders that 
replaced Khrushchev in 1964 did not share 
his experience. The problem, however, is 
that knowledge structures are supposed to 
be both enduring and communal. The 
cognitive mapping approach is thus not 
compatible with ad hoc'ery. 
More important, Khrushchev had at an 
earlier point employed something that 
looks very much like what the authors 
would term 'procedural representation'. 
Witness, for example, this extract of his 
remarks at the Khrushchev-Kennedy 
summit in Vienna in June 1961: 
{I}fthere is a single chairman of the control 
commission{. . .} he will be able to set the polic): 
{. .. J The people of the Soviet Union would never 
accept such a situation and if the United States 
wants him to be fired then it should pursue this line. 
{. .. ]Referring to the number of inspections, Mr. 
Khrushchev said that three inspections a year 
would be Slifjicient. A larger number ·would be 
tantamount to intelligence, something the Soviet 
Union cannot accept. 0 
This seems to be an example of the cause-
effect kind of reasoning that Bonham, 
Parshin, and Sergeev argue to be an 
attribute of procedural representation. 13 To 
argue that a change in Khrushchev's 
knowledge structures-as revealed through 
his capacity to communicate through 
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different modes of representation-resulted 
from the Cuban missile crisis, is thus 
problematic. Other examples abound. As 
to Kennedy, Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev 
themselves note that he used processual 
representation as early as in 1961 (228-9); 
in other words, that he used the two modes 
interchangeably. 
The idea that there is a unique connection 
between pre-understanding and mode of 
representation thus seem to whither away. 
Neither do the authors show that 
different modes of representation can erect 
insurmountable barriers to understanding. 
Even given the limited number of sources 
they utilize, it seems clear that Khrushchev 
and Kennedy understood each other quite 
well-more on that below. 
A general point should be made here. 
What the cognitive mapping process is 
about is converting language into signs, 
generalizing it in the process in order to 
illustrate modes of communication rather 
than the communication of a specific 
message. In essence, this is a form of 
translation or transcription. 14 Which, 
however, unavoidably raises the question 
of why, if this form of translation/ 
transcription is possible for researchers, it 
is not possible for politicians? This basic 
assumption is unreasonable, and the 
authors imply as much when observing that 
Kennedy and Khrushchev, as agreement on 
the LTBT neared, started 'translating' each 
other from processual to procedural 
representation, and vice versa (237-8). 
Given that it is possible for one person to 
communicate in both the procedural and 
the processual mode of representation, how 
are the differences between the two modes, 
and the choice of one or the other in a given 
situation, to be explained? One possibility 
is that it is the subject matter under 
discussion - and what the speaker has to 
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say-that determine mode of representation, 
and that politicians choose subject matter 
and mode of representation according to 
which message they want to communicate. 
This would imply, for example, that 
Kennedy and Khrushchev, as they 
approached common ground, found it in 
their best interest to represent the others 
statements in as favorable a light as 
possible, thus the "translations" observed 
by Bonham, Par shin, and Sergeev. It would 
also imply that the modes of representation 
are not necessary reflections of mental 
structures, but are rather lingual tools 
employed in the manner that the speaker 
deems most suited to achieve the object in 
the pursuit of which he is speaking. 
In one example utilized by the authors-
Khrushchev states that the West "have 
chosen the diplomatic approach: without 
refusing to directly take part in 
negotiations, they at the same time will not 
agree to accept concrete proposals on 
disarmament [ ... ] A complete system has 
been worked out to prevent the attainment 
of the goal, to make sure that the problem 
of disarmament ends in an impasse" (226). 
According to the alternative understanding 
of representation introduced above, 
Khrushchev is very well aware of his mode 
of representation here. His goal, 
meanwhile, is not to convey his 
understanding of the test-ban negotiations, 
but to make it clear that the Western 
powers were to blame for their failure. By 
presenting disarmament as a process 
whose success is dependent mainly on the 
parties' good will, he is able to avoid a 
discussion of the possible merits of the US 
position on inspection, representing it 
instead as a mere hindrance to the process 
of disarmament. 
It should be remarked that the statement 
also illustrates the rather fine line that 
separates 'processual' from 'procedural' 
representation; the last half of the quote 
could well be seen as an example of cause-
effect reasoning. As a general observation, 
it seems that neither the characteristics of 
nor actors' use of different modes of 
representation are nearly as absolute as 
implied in the cognitive mapping approach. 
It is possible, then, to argue that Bonham, 
Parshin, and Sergeev's explanations of the 
existence and significance of different 
modes of representation are open to 
dispute, and moreover serves to confuse 
rather than clarify the test-ban issue. 
Which, of course, implies that the existence 
of pre-undcrstandings and knowledge 
structures as presupposed by the cognitive 
mapping approach, is not demonstrated in 
their analysis. 11 
The "world view" appraoch and the test-
ban debates 
This is not to say that the manner in which 
Kennedy and Khrushchev viewed the world 
had no impact upon their approach to the 
test-ban issue. On the contrary, it is-as 
illustrated above-probable that their world 
views were the determining factor 
regarding Khrushchev's and Kennedy's 
test-ban policies, as implied in the above 
narration of the test-ban negotiations. 
That, however, was because their world 
views were fundamental in determining 
how Khrushchev and Kennedy defined the 
interests of their country, and thus their 
policies, not because they were unable to 
communicate or unable to understand each 
others' positions. 
When agreement was reached, moreover, 
that was because those interests-as a result 
of certain external developments-
converged regarding the prohibition of 
atmospheric, space, and sub-oceanic 
nuclear testing. As the subsequent twenty 
plus years of arms race illustrates rather 
well, however, the treaty implied no great 
concession, for either party. 
There are two basic differences between 
the world view approach and the cognitive 
mapping approach as applied to the test-
ban issue. First, the world view approach 
holds that the cognitive factors that 
determine policy are deep-seated, to a large 
extent shared within a community, and only 
change rather gradually. Single events, 
even seminal ones like the Cuban missile 
crisis, only rarely, and not in themselves, 
have such an impact. In fact, seminal 
events tend to be interpreted within the 
framework of the actors' world views. US 
decision makers, for example, took the 
Cuban missile crisis as a confirmation that 
communists were not to be trusted-for 
example to adhere to an uninspected 
comprehensive test ban, rather than 
concluding-as have several historians 
later-that agreement on nuclear 
disarmament had to be found at any cost 
to avoid similar situations. 
Policies, however, can change even when 
world views do not. The point is that world 
views determine how circumstances are 
interpreted and policies formed. Thus, if 
circumstances change, policies can change 
even if world views remain constant. The 
point seems obvious, but should not 
therefore be overlooked. This aspect of the 
world view approach makes it more useful 
than the cognitive mapping approach in 
explaining a conflict like the Cold War, 
where 40 years of general enmity and 
widely divergent conceptions of interest 
must be explained through an approach 
that also allows for the achievement of a 
series of limited but quite real agreements. 
A second difference is that the world 
view approach rejects the notion that 
IFS lnfo 1/03 15 
language is a function of world views only, 
and thus that only people sharing world 
views can communicate efficiently through 
language. In fact, the world view a pp roach 
presupposes that language can be used to 
communicate even when the cultural 
backgrounds and general outlook of actors 
differ. It is quite possible for these actors 
to understand each other's policies, 
potentially even to understand the world 
views behind them. That actors are able to 
understand each other's policies, however, 
does not necessarily imply that they are 
willing to make concessions to them. 
The third and possibly most fundamental 
difference seems to be that the terms 
'world views' and 'pre-understandings' do 
not refer to the same phenomena. 'Pre-
understandings' are general, almost 
abstract, ways of ordering the world-for 
example "development occurs through 
processes". Because of variations in the 
way of ordering the world, disagreements 
on specifics is held to be unavoidable. 
'World views', meanwhile, refer to 
perceptions regarding concrete aspects of 
the world-for example "US nuclear 
weapons superiority is a precondition for 
world peace". Given that decision makers 
hold different opinions of this kind, and 
combined with a given set of circumstances, 
disagreement will sometimes be 
unavoidable, as in the test-ban negotiations 
1958-63. 
The cognitive mapping approach seems 
to be based on a somewhat deterministic 
view of the workings of the human mind: 
it presupposes that although all humans 
hold the potential for both a 'holistic' and 
a 'structural' pre-undersranding, they do 
not themselves control which one, and thus 
neither their way of thinking and speaking. 
The world, accordning to this approach, is 
ordered either this way or that way. The 
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world vtew approach, meanwhile, holds 
that while representatives of different 
cultures certainly have a tendency to order 
the world in different ways, they are still 
able both to order it in other ways at times, 
and certainly able to comprehend how 
other actors order the world. Regarding the 
test-ban negotiations, this is clearly 
illustrated by the acute intellectual 
understanding the two parties show of each 
other's negotiating positions. 
A fourth difference is that the world view 
approach puts far greater emphasis on 
empirical investigation as a necessary basis 
for the analysis of concrete events. Two 
basic flaws in their approach to the 
empirical aspects of their subject weaken 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev's analysis of 
the test-ban issue: first, the purpose of all 
the texts they have chosen to analyze was 
to communicate and justify a negotiating 
position, either to the negotiating partner 
or to the general public16-as a result the 
texts are propagandistic in nature and 
contain various forms of rationalization for 
policies, rather than elaborations on the 
basic issues or the actual rationales behind 
policies; 17 as to their approach to the texts, 
the authors seem satisfied to demonstrate 
that Khrushchev and Kennedy employ 
different modes of representation at any 
given time, and seem to regard those 
demonstrations in and of themselves to 
have explanatory power-their approach 
thus rakes for granted the validity of 
aspects of the very theory they should be 
testing. 
The history of the nuclear test-ban 
negotiations is certainly open to various 
interpretations, and much of what has been 
written is open to contention. A study of 
one or two basic works, however, for 
example a cursory reading of Glen 
Seaborg's Kemtedy, Khrushchev and the 
Test Ban-which is listed tn the 
bibliography-and Robert Divine's Blowin' 
on the Wind-which is not, would have 
indicated to Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev 
that their understanding of the test-ban 
issue is in need of elaboration, and that 
many of their conclusions stand in stark 
contrast both to established interpretations 
and to any reasonable interpretation of 
easily available empirical evidence. That 
realization could conceivably have led them 
to make a more thorough investigation of 
available sources, engage the available 
historiography, and, presumably, reflect 
over the implications this would have for 
the validity of their thesis and their theory. 
To sharpen the argument against the 
cognitive mapping approach, the approach 
seems to tend towards both determinism 
and ad hoc'ery: determinism in the sense 
that deep-seated mental structures are held 
to explain all aspects of political behavior; 
ad hoc'ery in the sense that all that the 
authors have to do to explain actions that 
do not fit with those knowledge structures, 
is to postulate a change in them. The only 
evidence of the existence of these 
knowledge structures, meanwhile, is 
lingual practices which at closer scrutiny 
seem to vary independently of the 
knowledge structures of which they are 
argued to be symptoms. In this sense, the 
explanation that the cognitive mapping 
approach generates regarding the test-ban 
negotiations is circular: agreement is held 
to be impossible because of divergent 
knowledge structures; then there is 
agreement, and a change in knowledge 
structures is postulated to explain it; the 
only concrete evidence of that change in 
knowledge structures, however, is the very 
event that the authors wanted to explain 
in the first place. 
Conclusion 
For a theoretical approach to be useful, it 
should, as a minimum, add to the general 
understanding of the subject it is applied 
to. It is unclear whether the cognitive 
mapping approach as presented by 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev has the 
potential to do so On any subject. It is quite 
clear that the insights it yields regarding 
the test-ban issue in the early 1960s are 
unsustainable. 
As applied in the article analyzed above, 
the process of cognitive mapping bear more 
resemblance to transcription or translation 
than analysis, and fails to illustrate the one 
point that would lend it explanatory power: 
that differences in pre-understandings and 
modes of representation precluded mutual 
understanding and thus agreement. Even 
given the limited collection of texts 
analyzed by Bonham, Parshin and Sergeev, 
it seems clear that the problem during the 
comprehensive test-ban negotiations were 
not a lack of understanding, but a lack of 
common interest. As to the LTBT, it was 
caused not by changes tn pre-
understanding, but by a convergence of 
interests. Interests were in both cases 
defined in rhe nexus between actors' world 
views and their eval nation of the given 
circumstances. 
The difference between the cognitive 
mapping approach as applied to the test-
ban issue by Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev, 
and the world view approach advocated by 
this author, can be summarized as follows: 
According to the cognitive mapping 
approach, different cultural or sub cultural 
groups have different pre-understandings 
of the world. Resulting from this, they also 
represent reality in different and often 
incompatible ways. This tends to hinder 
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agreement in international negotiations. 
For agreements to be reached, new 
knowledge structures must thus emerge -
the parties must construct "a shared 
discursive space [ ... ] a shared reality" 
(238). Unless such a shared reality emerges, 
meaningful communication-not to mention 
agreement-is impossible. These factors are 
discovered through the analysis of texts, 
and it is the structure of the texts-not their 
content-that reveal the true nature of 
things. 
The world view approach, meanwhile, 
holds that different perceptions of reality 
is most certainly an important factor in 
determining how actors form interests. 
Hypothetically, different perceptions of the 
world may hinder agreement where room 
for agreement-for the 'uninterested 
observer'-may seem to exist. However, the 
world view approach also accepts that 
people holding different worlds views are 
able to communicate through language, 
and do at times come to agreement, even 
when no change in either party's world 
view has taken place, because interests-as 
the actors define them-sometimes do 
converge as a result of developments 
exogenous to-and in spite of differences in-
world views. This openness to changing 
circumstances and emphasis on empirical 
investigation lends the world view 
approach a flexibility, and an ability to 
explain incremental changes in policy, that 
the cognitive mapping approach lacks. 
As to the test-ban negotiations 1958-
1963, it seems that a theoretical approach 
emphasizing the importance of actors' 
world views as well as their interaction 
with other factors in determining actors' 
interests, paints a picture which both gives 
a better fit with the empirical evidence than 
does the cognitive mapping approach and-
as opposed to the conclusions of Bonham, 
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Parshin, and Sergeev-places the test-ban 
negotiations squarely within the general 
development of the Cold War. 
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Kemzedy, Khmshchev ... 
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'See: Seaborg, Kemzedy, Khrushchev .... As to the 
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hzside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to 
Khmshchev (London 1996). 
8For extreme versions, see: Geir Lundestad 0st 
' ' 
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I.M. Destler, 56; John Ranelagh, The Agency: 
The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York 
1987). For more moderate versions, see: Nuclear 
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eds. Olav Njolstad!Jorn Gjeldstad, John Lewis 
Gaddis, 'Nuclear Weapons and Cold War 
History', 49; Herken, Cardinal Choices 140· 
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Reeves, President Kennedy, 439; Glenn Seaborg 
with Benjamin S. Loeb, 'Approaching a 
Comprehensive Test Ban: A United States 
Historical Perspective', Disarmament: A periodic 
review by the United Nations, xvi (1993), 37. In 
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E1senhower years refers to the Cuban missile 
crisis as the main explanatory factor for why the 
LTBT was signed (Divine, Blowing. 323). 
'Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev argues that the 
Soviets "renewed interest in a test ban was 
reflected at the bargaining table in a series of 
Soviet concessions on the control issue" (221 ). 
That is at best disputable, see: memorandum of 
conversation on nuclear testing, 9 January 1963, 
Foreign Relations of the U"ited States, 1961-
1963, volume vii, Arms Control and 
Disarmament, p 628-9; memorandum of 
conversation on nuclear testing, 10 January, 
1963, Foreig" Relations of the U"ited States 
' 
1961-1963, volume vii, Arms Control and 
Disarmament, 630; premier Khrushchev letter to 
president Kennedy, 8 May 1963, Foreign 
Relatiotzs of the Utzited States, 1961-1963, 
volume vii, Arms Control and Disarmament 696-
8. 
10Boston, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 
Papers of President Kennedy, National Security 
Flies, Dept./ Agn. Series, points to be covered in 
preparation of forthcoming July 15 mission of 
Governor Harriman to Moscow, 6.20.63, boxes 
268-270, folder prep-Harriman trip to Moscow, 
pt Ill. 
11 See for example the section termed "The 
Limited Test-Ban Negotiations" (220-22), which 
deals with the negotiations at large, and contains 
no elaboration on inspection and the distinction 
between a limited and a comprehensive test-ban 
treaty. 
1 ~iv1emorandurn of Conversation, meeting 
between The President and Chairman Khrushchev 
in Vienna, June 4, 1961, Boston, John F. Kennedy 
Library, P;rpers of President Kennedy, Presidential 
Oifice Files, Countries box 126, folder USSR-
Vit.·nn.t meet in~. ~lemos of conversations (1), 7. 
1
'The 'itJrt.·ments .uc taken from a US summary 
of rhe tJlk<, hut there is little reason to think that 
it is not .Kcur:ue, as the summary was classified 
'secret', and moreover was probably to be used 
for internal deliberations later, in which case 
accuracy \\-'ouiJ he paramount. 
14The authors 1mply this point themselves; that 
intercoder reproducibility can be achieved in the 
mappm~ process (224-5), illustrates clearly the 
fact that language has a quite specific meaning, 
;:wJ that phrases can be categorized according to 
rhis meaning. 
1
'1t could be argued, of course, that differences in 
'pre-undcrstanding' hinder the emergence of 
common ground, quite apart from the lingual 
variatiom postul.ued to result from the pre-
undcrstandings. It is also possible to argue that 
wh.Je the differences of modes of representation 
do not erect insurmountable barriers to under-
standing;, they can still lead to misunderstan-
dings. Neither seems to be the argument of 
Bonham, Parshin, and Sergeev, however. 
Moreover, the viability of either argument would 
have to be demonstrated-they cannot be 
postulated. 
"According to the authors, they have analyzed 
the following texts: Radio-television address by 
President Kennedy on the Vienna meeting, 6 June 
1961; radio-television address by Premier 
Khrushchev on the Vienna meeting, 15 June 
1961; United Sra res note to the Soviet Union 
regarding the nucle<1r test-ban negotiations, 17 
June 1961; Soviet note to the United States 
regarding the nuclear test-ban negotiations, 5 
July 1961; statement by Premier Khrushchev 
regarding the proposed ban on atmospheric tests, 
9 September 1961; statements by President 
Kennedy on nuclear tests, 2 November 1961; 
letter from Premier Khrushchev to President 
Kennedy, 19 December 1962; letter from 
President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev, 28 
December 1962; address by President Kennedy at 
The American University, 10 June 1963; inter-
view of Premier Khrushchev with Pravda and 
Izvestiya editors, 15 June 1963; statement by 
Premier Khrushchev at Berlin, 2 July 1963; radio-
television address by President Kennedy, 26 July 
1963; and interview of Premier Khrushchev with 
Pravda and lzvestiya correspondents, 27 July 
1963. 
17Not one of the texts chosen by Bonham, 
Sergeev, and Parshin are from intra-
administration discussions, even though such 
material is easily available on the US side. This 
makes it hard to figure out what constituted the 
essence of the two parties' negotiating positions. 
For such sources, see for example: Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, 
volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament; and 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Collection and 
The Nuclear History Project at the National 
Security Archives (located at the Gelman Library, 
George Washington University, Washington, 
D.C.). 
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